### Books

- 1979.
*The Unprovability of Consistency: An Essay in Modal Logic*. Cambridge University Press.
- 1990 (editor).
*Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam*. Cambridge University Press.
- 1993.
*The Logic of Provability*. Cambridge University Press. Not a revision of Boolos (1979).
- 1998 (Richard Jeffrey and John P. Burgess, eds.).
*Logic, Logic, and Logic*. Harvard University Press.
- 2007 (1974) (with Richard Jeffrey).
*Computability and Logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

### Articles

LLL = reprinted in

*Logic, Logic, and Logic*.

FPM = reprinted in Demopoulos, W., ed., 1995.

*Frege's Philosophy of Mathematics*. Harvard Univ. Press.

1968 (with Hilary Putnam), "Degrees of unsolvability of constructible sets of integers,"

*Journal of Symbolic Logic 33*: 497-513.

1969, "Effectiveness and natural languages" in Sidney Hook, ed.,

*Language and Philosophy*. New York University Press.

1970, "On the semantics of the constructible levels," ' 16

*: 139-148.*1970a, "A proof of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem,"

*Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 11*: 76-78.

1971, "The iterative conception of set,"

*Journal of Philosophy 68*: 215-231. Reprinted in Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam, eds.,1984.

*Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings*, 2nd ed. Cambridge Univ. Press: 486-502. LLL

1973, "A note on Evert Willem Beth's theorem,"

*Bulletin de l'Academie Polonaise des Sciences 2*: 1-2.

1974, "Arithmetical functions and minimization,"

*Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 20*: 353-354.

1974a, "Reply to Charles Parsons' 'Sets and classes'." First published in LLL.

1975, "Friedman's 35th problem has an affirmative solution,"

*Notices of the American Mathematical Society 22*: A-646.

1975a, "On Kalmar's consistency proof and a generalization of the notion of omega-consistency,"

*Archiv für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung 17*: 3-7.

1975a, "On second-order logic,"

*Journal of Philosophy 72*: 509-527. LLL.

1976, "On deciding the truth of certain statements involving the notion of consistency,"

*Journal of Symbolic Logic 41*: 779-781.

1977, "On deciding the provability of certain fixed point statements,"

*Journal of Symbolic Logic 42*: 191-193.

1979, "Reflection principles and iterated consistency assertions,"

*Journal of Symbolic Logic 44*: 33-35.

1980, "Omega-consistency and the diamond,"

*Studia Logica 39*: 237-243.

1980a, "On systems of modal logic with provability interpretations,"

*Theoria 46*: 7-18.

1980b, "Provability in arithmetic and a schema of Grzegorczyk,"

*Fundamenta Mathematicae 106*: 41-45.

1980c, "Provability, truth, and modal logic,"

*Journal of Philosophical Logic 9*: 1-7.

1980d, Review of Raymond M. Smullyan,

*What is the Name of This Book?* *The Philosophical Review 89*: 467-470.

1981, "For every A there is a B,"

*Linguistic Inquiry 12*: 465-466.

1981a, Review of Robert M. Solovay,

*Provability Interpretations of Modal Logic*,"

*Journal of Symbolic Logic 46*: 661-662.

1982, "Extremely undecidable sentences,"

*Journal of Symbolic Logic 47*: 191-196.

1982a, "On the nonexistence of certain normal forms in the logic of provability,"

*Journal of Symbolic Logic 47*: 638-640.

1984, "Don't eliminate cut,"

*Journal of Philosophical Logic 13*: 373-378. LLL.

1984a, "The logic of provability,"

*American Mathematical Monthly 91*: 470-480.

1984b, "Nonfirstorderizability again,"

*Linguistic Inquiry 15*: 343.

1984c, "On 'Syllogistic inference',"

*Cognition 17*: 181-182.

1984d, "To be is to be the value of a variable (or some values of some variables),"

*Journal of Philosophy 81*: 430-450. LLL.

1984e, "Trees and finite satisfiability: Proof of a conjecture of John Burgess,"

*Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 25*: 193-197.

1984f, "The justification of mathematical induction,"

*PSA 2*: 469-475. LLL.

1985, "1-consistency and the diamond,"

*Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 26*: 341-347.

1985a, "Nominalist Platonism,"

*The Philosophical Review 94*: 327-344. LLL.

1985b, "Reading the Begriffsschrift,"

*Mind 94*: 331-344. LLL; FPM: 163-81.

1985c (with Giovanni Sambin), "An incomplete system of modal logic,"

*Journal of Philosophical Logic 14*: 351-358.

1986, Review of Yuri Manin,

*A Course in Mathematical Logic*,

*Journal of Symbolic Logic 51*: 829-830.

1986-87, "Saving Frege from contradiction,"

*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87*: 137-151. LLL; FPM 438-52.

1987, "The consistency of Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic" in J. J. Thomson, ed., 1987.

*On Being and Saying: Essays for Richard Cartwright*. MIT Press: 3-20. LLL; FPM: 211-233.

1987a, "A curious inference,"

*Journal of Philosophical Logic 16*: 1-12. LLL.

1987b, "On notions of provability in provability logic,"

*Abstracts of the 8th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science 5*: 236-238.

1987c (with Vann McGee), "The degree of the set of sentences of predicate provability logic that are true under every interpretation,"

*Journal of Symbolic Logic 52*: 165-171.

1988, "Alphabetical order,"

*Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 29*: 214-215.

1988a, Review of Craig Smorynski,

*Self-Reference and Modal Logic*,

*Journal of Symbolic Logic 53*: 306-309.

1989, "Iteration again,"

*Philosophical Topics 17*: 5-21. LLL.

1989a, "A new proof of the Gödel incompleteness theorem,"

*Notices of the American Mathematical Society 36*: 388-390. LLL. An afterword appeared under the title "A letter from George Boolos," ibid., p. 676. LLL.

1990, "On 'seeing' the truth of the Gödel sentence,"

*Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13*: 655-656. LLL.

1990a, Review of Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy,

*Turing's World and Tarski's World*,

*Journal of Symbolic Logic 55*: 370-371.

1990b, Review of V. A. Uspensky,

*Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem*,

*Journal of Symbolic Logic 55*: 889-891.

1990c, "The standard of equality of numbers" in Boolos, G., ed.,

*Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam*. Cambridge Univ. Press: 261-278. LLL; FPM: 234-254.

1991, "Zooming down the slippery slope," Nous 25

*: 695-706. LLL.*1991a (with Giovanni Sambin), "Provability: The emergence of a mathematical modality,"

*Studia Logica 50*: 1-23.

1993, "The analytical completeness of Dzhaparidze's polymodal logics,"

*Annals of Pure and Applied Logic* 61: 95-111.

1993a, "Whence the contradiction?"

*Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 67*: 213-233. LLL.

1994, "1879?" in P. Clark and B. Hale, eds.

*Reading Putnam*. Oxford: Blackwell: 31-48. LLL.

1994a, "The advantages of honest toil over theft," in A. George, ed.,

*Mathematics and Mind*. Oxford University Press: 27-44. LLL.

1994b, " Gödel's second incompleteness theorem explained in words of one syllable,"

*Mind* 103: 1-3. LLL.

1995, "Frege's theorem and the Peano postulates,"

*Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 1*: 317-326. LLL.

1995a, "Introductory note to *1951" in Solomon Feferman et al., eds.,

*Kurt Gödel, Collected Works, vol. 3*. Oxford University Press: 290-304. LLL. *1951 is Gödel’s 1951 Gibbs lecture, "Some basic theorems on the foundations of mathematics and their implications."

1995b, "Quotational ambiguity" in Leonardi, P., and Santambrogio, M., eds.

*On Quine*. Cambridge University Press: 283-296. LLL

1996, "The hardest logical puzzle ever,"

*Harvard Review of Philosophy* 6: 62-65. LLL. Italian translation by Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, "L'indovinello piu difficile del mondo,"

*La Repubblica* (16 April 1992): 36-37.

1996a, "On the proof of Frege's theorem" in A. Morton and S. P. Stich, eds.,

*Paul Benacerraf and his Critics*. Cambridge MA: Blackwell. LLL.

1997, "Constructing Cantorian counterexamples,"

*Journal of Philosophical Logic 26*: 237-239. LLL.

1997a, "Is Hume's principle analytic?" In Richard G. Heck, Jr., ed.,

*Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett*. Oxford Univ. Press: 245-61. LLL.

1997b (with Richard Heck), "Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, §§82-83" in Matthias Schirn, ed.,

*Philosophy of Mathematics Today*. Oxford Univ. Press. LLL.

1998, "Gottlob Frege and the Foundations of Arithmetic." First published in LLL. French translation in Mathieu Marion and Alain Voizard eds., 1998.

*Frege. Logique et philosophie*. Montréal and Paris: L'Harmattan: 17-32.

2000, "Must we believe in set theory?" in Gila Sher and Richard Tieszen, eds.,

*Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honour of Charles Parsons*. Cambridge University Press. LLL.