Thomas F. (hardtack) -
This is an fascinating, critical discussion of how the Allies mismanaged the invasion of Sicily. They did such a bad job even the Germans were amazed at the many mistakes made. However, the Allies leaned from those mistakes and incorporated many of those lessons into the Normandy invasion.
You should be aware the author has a bias toward British General Montgomery even though he criticizes him in many places.
I did have some problems with the book, which I found interesting as well as annoying. The author claims no French soldiers were evacuated from Dunkirk. How he missed the well over 100,000 French troops who were lifted off those beaches, and then returned to France to continue fighting, mystifies me.
During the Sicily fighting the author has Montgomery not trying to keep the American forces out of the campaign. The claims that Montgomery and British Field Marshal Alexander intentionally gave the American forces a small role are well established. They only changed their minds when the British Eighth Army was deadlocked south of Mt Etna. If Alexander had let the American Seventh Army take a major role earlier on, the capture of Sicily would have occurred much sooner. Even the author wondered how Alexander was kept in high command after Sicily.
After Sicily was captured, Montgomery, as he did for Normandy, rewrote the plans to suggest the campaign went as he had originally planned. Montgomery rewrote history so often that he didn't publish his memoirs until after Dwight Eisenhower died, so that Eisenhower couldn't call him a liar. He wasted that effort though, as many others did call him that.
The author also points out the coordination between the air, naval and ground forces in this campaign was almost non-existent. For example, the air forces once again---as they did until almost the end of the war---focused on strategic bombing instead of supporting the ground troops tactically. If close air support had been implemented, Allied casualties would have been far less and the campaign to seize Sicily would have been much shorter. This failure to coordinate was one reason why the Germans and Italians were able to successfully escape across the Messina strait to the Italian boot.
Finally, unlike you see in the movie "Patton," Montgomery did encourage Patton to take Messina. But then you never should believe the history you see on the "Silver Screen." Unfortunately for the Allies, British General O'Connor was captured by the Germans during the fighting in North Africa. He was a much better general than Montgomery and was in line to command the Eighth Army. For an excellent analysis of the British generals read, "The Desert Generals" by Correli Barnett, an British World War II historian.
You should be aware the author has a bias toward British General Montgomery even though he criticizes him in many places.
I did have some problems with the book, which I found interesting as well as annoying. The author claims no French soldiers were evacuated from Dunkirk. How he missed the well over 100,000 French troops who were lifted off those beaches, and then returned to France to continue fighting, mystifies me.
During the Sicily fighting the author has Montgomery not trying to keep the American forces out of the campaign. The claims that Montgomery and British Field Marshal Alexander intentionally gave the American forces a small role are well established. They only changed their minds when the British Eighth Army was deadlocked south of Mt Etna. If Alexander had let the American Seventh Army take a major role earlier on, the capture of Sicily would have occurred much sooner. Even the author wondered how Alexander was kept in high command after Sicily.
After Sicily was captured, Montgomery, as he did for Normandy, rewrote the plans to suggest the campaign went as he had originally planned. Montgomery rewrote history so often that he didn't publish his memoirs until after Dwight Eisenhower died, so that Eisenhower couldn't call him a liar. He wasted that effort though, as many others did call him that.
The author also points out the coordination between the air, naval and ground forces in this campaign was almost non-existent. For example, the air forces once again---as they did until almost the end of the war---focused on strategic bombing instead of supporting the ground troops tactically. If close air support had been implemented, Allied casualties would have been far less and the campaign to seize Sicily would have been much shorter. This failure to coordinate was one reason why the Germans and Italians were able to successfully escape across the Messina strait to the Italian boot.
Finally, unlike you see in the movie "Patton," Montgomery did encourage Patton to take Messina. But then you never should believe the history you see on the "Silver Screen." Unfortunately for the Allies, British General O'Connor was captured by the Germans during the fighting in North Africa. He was a much better general than Montgomery and was in line to command the Eighth Army. For an excellent analysis of the British generals read, "The Desert Generals" by Correli Barnett, an British World War II historian.
