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Pareco: Land, local strongmen, and the roots of militia politics in North Kivu (Usalama Project)
Pareco Land local strongmen and the roots of militia politics in North Kivu - Usalama Project Author:Jason Stearns This report provides a detailed account of the armed groups emerging from the Hutu community in North Kivu. It takes as its focus the Coalition des patriotes résistants congolais (PARECO, Alliance of Resistant Congolese Patriots). The stabilization of the eastern DRC requires a deep understanding of the dynamics underlying each armed faction. In... more » the case of the Hutu community, the groups that emerged in the 1960s and early 1990s were initially tied to localized struggles over land and citizenship. In recent years, however, politicians in Goma, Kinshasa, and Kigali have been increasingly adept at harnessing these grievances to further their personal interests. Rebellion has thus become an essential part of elite strategies to bolster their stature and protect their interests. While PARECO was integrated into the national army in 2009, the recent M23 rebellion threatens to give a new impetus to rural militias, including those with roots in the Hutu community, with devastating consequences for the civilian population.
Pending national reforms in the DRC could ease or escalate armed violence. The central government in Kinshasa has been reluctant to decentralize the state and hold local elections, as mandated by the constitution. Nor has it provided a vision for strengthening decrepit local administrations. This attitude has only reinforced the belief among regional elites that they need to maintain military leverage to protect their interests. Each of these reforms, however, if carried out precipitously, could also spark new conflicts.
A similar logic applies to land reform, which has recently elicited renewed interest among donor governments. While land disputes are not the main cause of violence today, it is difficult to envisage stability in the eastern highlands of North Kivu without comprehensive land reform. The main challenge, once again, is the weak state, which has allowed customary chiefs to continue their administration of much of the land, producing a parallel system of land management that has contributed to communal tensions. Simply converting all customary titles into their legal equivalents, however, could further aggravate those tensions and allow landholding elites to increase their already vast properties at the expense of the peasantry.
Finally, the government in Kinshasa will have to decide how to deal with remaining armed groups. A strong national army and police force are still a long way off, so despite official pronouncements, Kinshasa will bear the responsibility of including at least some elements of demobilization and integration in any future approach to the crisis. The key will be to design programmes that avoid reinforcing the ?revolving door? logic of integration/rebellion on the part of armed groups that has predominated in recent years.« less