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The Philosophy of Natural Theology, an Essay Which Obtained a Prize at Oxford, Nov. 26th, 1872
The Philosophy of Natural Theology an Essay Which Obtained a Prize at Oxford Nov 26th 1872 Author:William Jackson General Books publication date: 2009 Original publication date: 1874 Notes: This is a black and white OCR reprint of the original. It has no illustrations and there may be typos or missing text. When you buy the General Books edition of this book you get free trial access to Million-Books.com where you can select from more than a million book... more »s for free. Excerpt: ADDITIONAL NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS TO CHAPTER II. A. -- ON THE ABSTRACT REASONINGS INVOLVED IN NATURAL THEOLOGY. In his discourse on Natural Theology, Lord Brougham writes thus (p. 78): -- " The whole reasoning proceeds necessarily upon the assumption that there exists a being or thing separate from, and independent of, matter, and conscious of its own existence, which we call mind. For the argument is, ' Had I to accomplish this purpose, I should have used some such means'; or, ' Had I used these means, I should have thought I was accomplishing some such purpose.' Perceiving the adaptation of the means to the end, the inference is, that some being has acted as we should ourselves act, and with the same views. But when we so speak, and so reason, we are all the while referring to an intelligent principle or existence; we are referring to our mind, and not to our bodily frame." " The belief that mind exists is essential to the whole argument by which we infer that the Deity exists. This belief ... is the foundation of Natural Theology in all its branches ; and upon the scheme of materialism no rational, indeed no intelligible, account can be given of a first cause, or of the creation or government of the universe." In a footnote, Lord Brougham adds : -- " It is worthy of observation that not the least allusion is made in Dr. Paley's work to the argument here stated, although it is the foundation of the whole of Natural Theology. Not only does this author leave entirely untouched the argument a priori (as it is called), and also all the inductive arguments derived from the phenomena of mind, but he ...« less