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Search - The Rationality of Terrorism: Strategies for Power in Chaos

The Rationality of Terrorism Strategies for Power in Chaos
Author: Alexander Farrow

How do terrorists really think? What motivates a terrorist organization? Why is violence the weapon of choice? This groundbreaking, empirical theory plunges deep into terrorist rationale by exploring terrorism and counter warfare strategies (counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, antiterrorism, and concession). Specifically, I explore the rea... more »son why some organizations, like ISIL and Hezbollah, not only conduct attacks but also establish shadow governments by controlling the water supply and even taxing the population. Constructing a game theoretical ?strategic interaction model?, I analyze how a terrorist organization competes with a government for social control over the population. The conclusion of my modeling is that terrorism is inversely proportional to power, measured by social control. When a terrorist organization is less powerful than the government, it attacks. When it is more powerful, it governs. To illustrate the model, I explore shifts in social control; the primary case studies are Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS, ISIL, Daesh). My hope is that this theory helps nations precisely suppress terrorist organizations with the appropriate combination of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. _______ In Chapter 1, I introduce the puzzle of how violent terrorist organizations often act as shadow governments, supporting the population. In Chapter 2, I outline contemporary literature on terrorism. Specifically, I define the terms terrorism and terrorist organization to ensure that the theory is appropriately applied. Next, I outline the theoretical components of terrorism, explaining concepts like fear as a force multiplier. Then, I illustrate the fundamental components of counter warfare, including counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies. Finally, I illustrate why contemporary literature is unable to adequately explain long run shifts in terrorist strategy. I therefore suggest a new model for studying terrorism ? a strategic interaction model. In Chapter 3, I develop a strategic interaction model of terrorism. Firstly, I define the rules of interaction between a terrorist organization, a government, and a population. Then, I establish a connection between political power and social control. Next, I construct the terrorist organization and government?s social control functions in order to analyze each of their respective interactions with the population. Finally, I analyze how the two functions interdependently determine primary warfare strategies. In Chapter 4, I apply this theory to two case studies using time and shift in social control as the independent variables and strategy as the dependent variable. I choose Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Taliban in Afghanistan as case studies because of their definitive shifts in social control. Hezbollah gained significant control after ousting Israel from Lebanon in 2000. The Taliban, on the other hand, lost significant control after the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the establishment of a democratic regime in 2004. In order to quantify shifts in terrorism strategy, I aggregate the number of yearly and monthly attacks. Finally, using narratives, regressions, t-tests, and graphs, I analyze the relationship between social control and strategy shifts. In Chapter 5, I prescribe counter warfare strategies. I briefly outline general steps that the government takes when contemplating primary strategies to combat a terrorist organization. I then apply these counter warfare strategies to ISIL. In this chapter, I hope to give politicians, military commanders, analysts and scholars a more practical lens through which to evaluate counter warfare options. Terrorism cripples populations with fear and chaos. By shedding light on how it works, I hope to develop a new approach to how the international community can counter future terrorism.

ISBN-13: 9781520210650
ISBN-10: 1520210655
Publication Date: 12/23/2016
Pages: 120
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Publisher: Independently published
Book Type: Paperback
Members Wishing: 0
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