Principles
Liddell Hart set out following World War I to address the causes of the war's high casualty rate. He arrived at a set of principles that he considered the basis of all good strategy, principles which, Liddell Hart claimed, were ignored by nearly all commanders in World War I.
He reduced this set of principles to a single phrase:
the indirect approach; and to two fundamentals:
- direct attacks against an enemy firmly in position almost never work and should never be attempted
- to defeat the enemy one must first upset his equilibrium, which is not accomplished by the main attack, but must be done before the main attack can succeed.
In Liddell Hart's words,
In strategy the longest way round is often the shortest way there; a direct approach to the object exhausts the attacker and hardens the resistance by compression, whereas an indirect approach loosens the defender's hold by upsetting his balance.
He also claimed that
The profoundest truth of war is that the issue of battle is usually decided in the minds of the opposing commanders, not in the bodies of their men.
This argues that one succeeds by keeping one's enemy uncertain about the situation and one's intentions, and by delivering what he does not expect and has therefore not prepared for.
Hart explains that one should not employ a rigid strategy revolving around powerful direct attacks nor fixed defensive positions. Instead, he prefers a more fluid
elastic defence, where a mobile contingent can move as necessary in order to satisfy the conditions for the
indirect approach. He would later cite Erwin Rommel's Northern Africa campaign as a classical example of his theory.
He arrived at his conclusions after studying the great strategists of history (especially Sun Tzu, Napoleon, and Belisarius) and their victories. He believed the indirect approach formed the common element in the careers of the men he studied. He also advocated the indirect approach as a valid strategy in other fields of endeavour, such as business, romance, etc.
As of 2009, Liddell Hart's personal papers and library form the central collection in the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at King's College London.
Myths and controversy surrounding Blitzkrieg
According to legend Liddell Hart saw his theories, similar to or even developed from his own, adopted by Germany and used against the United Kingdom and its allies during World War II with the practice of
Blitzkrieg. In recent years historians have uncovered evidence that Liddell Hart distorted and falsified facts to make it appear as if his ideas were adopted. After the war Liddell Hart imposed his own perceptions, after the event, claiming that the mobile tank warfare practiced by the
Wehrmacht was a result of his influence.
Blitzkrieg itself is not an official doctrine and historians in recent times have come to the conclusion it did not exist as such:
It was the opposite of a doctrine. Blitzkrieg consisted of an avalanche of actions that were sorted out less by design and more by success. In hindsight - and with some help from Liddell Hart - this torrent of action was squeezed into something it never was: an operational design.
By "manipulation and contrivance, Liddell Hart distorted the actual circumstances of the
Blitzkrieg formation and he obscured its origins. Through his indoctrinated idealization of an ostentatious concept he reinforced the myth of
Blitzkrieg. By imposing, retrospectively, his own perceptions of mobile warfare upon the shallow concept of
Blitzkrieg, he created a theoretical imbroglio that has taken 40 years to unravel". The early 1950s literature transformed
Blitzkrieg into a historical military doctrine, which carried the signature of Liddell Hart and Heinz Guderian. The main evidence of Liddell Hart's deceit and "tendentious" report of history can be found in his letters to the German Generals Erich von Manstein and Heinz Guderian, as well as relatives and associates of Erwin Rommel. Liddell Hart, in letters to Guderian, "imposed his own fabricated version of
Blitzkrieg on the latter and compelled him to proclaim it as original formula".
When Guderian wrote his memoirs, the edition published in Germany differed to the one published in the United Kingdom. In the German version no mention is made of the "English" influence. The German version was published before the British copy. An explanation can be found in the correspondence between the two men. In one letter to Guderian, Liddell Hart asked the German General to give him credit for giving the
Wehrmacht its tactical-operational method in 1940:
You might care to insert a remark that I emphasized the use of armoured forces for long-range operations against the opposing Army's communications, and also the proposed type of armoured division combining Panzer and Panzer-infantry units - and that these points particularly impressed you.
Guderian did as Liddell Hart requested, "hence the planted paragraph".Historian Kenneth Macksey found a copy of Liddell Hart's request to Guderian in the German General's papers, but not in Liddell Hart's. When Liddell Hart was questioned about this in 1968, and the discrepancy between the English and German editions of Guderian's memoirs, "he gave a conveniently unhelpful though strictly truthful reply. ('There is nothing about the matter in my file of correspondence with Guderian himself except...that I thanked him...for what he said in that additional paragraph'.)".