Although Clausewitz participated in numerous military campaigns, he was primarily a military theorist interested in the examination of war. He wrote a careful, systematic, philosophical examination of war in all its aspects, as he saw it and taught it. The result was his principal work,
On War, the West's premier work on the philosophy of war. His examination was so carefully considered that it was only partially completed by the time of his death. Clausewitz sought to revise the text, in 1827 and just before his death, to include more material on counter-insurgency and forms of war other than between states, but these revisions were never included in the published document. Other soldiers before this time had written treatises on various military subjects, but none undertook a great philosophical examination of war on the scale of Clausewitz's and Tolstoy's, both of which were inspired by the events of the Napoleonic Era.
Clausewitz's work is still studied today, demonstrating its continued relevance. Lynn Montross writing on that topic in
War Through the Ages said; "This outcome...may be explained by the fact that Jomini produced a system of war, Clausewitz a philosophy. The one has been outdated by new weapons, the other still influences the strategy behind those weapons."
Clausewitz introduced systematic philosophical contemplation into Western military thinking, with powerful implications not only for historical and analytical writing but for practical policy, military instruction, and operational planning. He relied on his own experiences, contemporary writings about Napoleon, and on a small body of historical sources. His historiographical approach is evident in his first extended study, written when he was twenty-five, of the Thirty Years War. He rejects the Enlightenment's view of the war as a chaotic muddle and instead explains its drawn-out operations by the economy and technology of the age, the social characteristics of the troops, and the commanders' politics and psychology. From then on, his attention to psychological factors added to the compound character of his interpretations. In
On War, Clausewitz sees all wars as the sum of decisions, actions, and reactions in an uncertain, dangerous context but also as a socio-political phenomenon. He has several definitions, the most famous one being that war is the continuation of politics by other means. He also stressed the complex nature of war which encompasses both the socio-political and the operational and stresses the primacy of national policy.
Clausewitz conceived of war as a political, social, economic and military totality involving the entire population of a nation at war. He saw war as a social act and as an extension of politics. Unlike Jomini, who stressed control of central geographical locations, he stressed that wars are decided by decisive battles.
Clausewitz's emphasis on the superiority of the defense suggests aggressive attacks can be failures. He emphasizes the fusion of the regular army with militia, or citizen soldiers, as the only effective method of national defense. This point is especially important as it ends the independence and isolation of the regular military and democraticizes the armed forces much as universal suffrage democraticized politics.
In contrast to Jomini, Clausewitz largely dismissed the value of military intelligence: "Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain. ... In short, most intelligence is false." His conclusions were influenced by his personal experiences in the Prussian Army, which was often in an intelligence fog due to the superior abilities of Napoleon's system. Clausewitz acknowledges that friction creates enormous difficulties for the realization of any plan, and the "fog of war" hinders commanders from knowing what is happening, but it is precisely in respect of this challenge that he develops the concept of military genius, whose capabilities are seen above all as the executive arm of planning.
Principal ideas
Some of the key ideas discussed in
On War include:
- the dialectical approach to military analysis
- the methods of "critical analysis"
- the nature of the balance-of-power mechanism
- the relationship between political objectives and military objectives in war
- the asymmetrical relationship between attack and defense
- the nature of "military genius" (involving matters of personality and character, beyond intellect)
- the "fascinating trinity" (wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit) of war
- philosophical distinctions between "absolute" or "ideal war," and "real war"
- in "real war," the distinctive poles of a) limited war and b) war to "render the enemy helpless"
- "war" belongs fundamentally to the social realm...rather than to the realms of art or science
- "strategy" belongs primarily to the realm of art
- "tactics" belongs primarily to the realm of science
- the importance of "moral forces" (more than simply "morale") as opposed to quantifiable physical elements
- the "military virtues" of professional armies (which do not necessarily trump the rather different virtues of other kinds of fighting forces)
- conversely, the very real effects of a superiority in numbers and "mass"
- the essential unpredictability of war
- the "fog" of war
- "friction"
- strategic and operational "centers of gravity"
- the "culminating point of the offensive"
- the "culminating point of victory"