Michael Levin is a philosophy professor at City University of New York. He has published on metaphysics, epistemology, race, homosexuality, animal rights, the philosophy of archaeology, the philosophy of logic, philosophy of language, and the philosophy of science.
Levin's central research interests are in Epistemology (Reliabilism and Gettier Problems) and in philosophy of race.
Levin argues that homosexual acts are abnormal because their participants are not using their sexual organs for what they are for, and that this abnormality must be a source of unhappiness, even though it may go unrecognized. Philosopher Roger Scruton has criticized Levin's attempt to show that homosexuality is abnormal, calling it absurd.
Feminist Susan Faludi writes in Backlash that Levin's 1988 book Feminism and Freedom characterizes feminism as an "antidemocratic, if not totalitarian, ideology" without a single redeeming feature.
Timothy F. Murphy writes that while Levin "more or less accepts that there is a strong biological basis for homoerotic orientation" he nevertheless believes that antigay discrimination may be defensible on several grounds, including the possibility that there is a biologically based dislike of homosexuality.
Levin agrees with Arthur Jensen and Richard Lynn that white people score higher on IQ tests than black people due to genetic differences...a view that has been criticized by scholars such as Leon Kamin of Princeton University.
He was cited by the Southern Poverty Law Center's publication Intelligence Report (Summer 2006) for repeatedly addressing the American Renaissance organization's bi-annual conferences and then not attending due to the anti-Semitism he encountered among members. SPLCenter.org: Irreconcilable Differences
In a 1982 essay "The Case for Torture" Levin argued that "there are situations where torture is not merely permissible but morally mandatory." Levin reiterated this view in 2009.
Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem, Oxford University Press, 1979. ISBN 0-19-824415-0.
Feminism and Freedom, Transaction Publishers, 1987. ISBN 978-0887386701
Why Race Matters: Race Differences and What They Mean, Praeger Publishers, 1997. ISBN 0-275-95789-6
Articles and essays
Levin, M. E. 1968. Fine, Mathematics, and Theory Change. The Journal of Philosophy 65, no. 2: 52-56.
Levin, M. E. 1971. Length Relativity. The Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 6: 164-174.
Levin, M. E. 1973. On explanation in archaeology: a rebuttal to Fritz and Plog. American Antiquity 38, no. 4: 387-395.
Levin, M. E. 1974. Kant’s Derivation of the Formula of Universal Law as an Ontological Argument. Kant-Studien 65, no. 1-4: 50-66.
Levin, M. E. 1975. Kripke's argument against the identity thesis. The Journal of Philosophy 72, no. 6: 149-167.
Levin, M. E. 1975. Relativity, Spatial and Ontological. Nous: 243-267.
Levin, M. E. 1976. The extensionality of causation and causal-explanatory contexts. Philosophy of Science 43, no. 2: 266-277.
Levin, M. E. 1976. On the ascription of functions to objects, with special reference to inference in archaeology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 6, no. 3: 227.
Levin, M. E. 1977. Animal rights evaluated. The Humanist 37, no. 4: 12-15.
Levin, M. E., and M. R. Levin. 1977. Flagpoles, shadows and deductive explanation. Philosophical Studies 32, no. 3: 293-299.
Levin, M. E., and M. R. Levin. 1978. The independence results of set theory: An informal exposition. Synthese 38, no. 1: 1-34.
Levin, M. E., and M. R. Levin. 1978. Lavoisier's Slow Burn. Philosophy of Science 45, no. 4: 626-629.
Levin, M. E. 1979. On theory-change and meaning-change. Philosophy of Science 46, no. 3: 407-424.
Levin, M. E. 1979. Quine's View (s) of Logical Truth. Essays on the Philosophy ofW. V. Quine: 45-67.
Levin, M. E. 1979. The universalizability of moral judgments revisited. Mind 88, no. 1: 115.
Levin, M. E. 1979. Forcing and the Indeterminacy of Translation. Erkenntnis 14, no. 1: 25-32.
Levin, M. E. 1979. Ahab as Socratic Philosopher: The Myth of the Cave Inverted. ATQ: The American Transcendental Quarterly 41: 61-73.
Levin, M. E., and M. R. Levin. 1979. The modal confusion in Rawls' original position. Analysis 39, no. 2: 82.
Levin, M. E. 1980. Reverse discrimination, shackled runners, and personal identity. Philosophical Studies 37, no. 2: 139-149.
Levin, M. E. 1981. Equality of opportunity. The Philosophical Quarterly 31, no. 123: 110-125.
Levin, M. E. 1981. Is racial discrimination special? The Journal of Value Inquiry 15, no. 3: 225-234.
Levin, M. E. 1981. Phenomenal Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42, no. 1: 42-58.
Levin, M. E. 1984. Why we believe in other minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44, no. 3: 343-359.
Levin, M. E. 2007. Bundling Hume with Kripkenstein. Synthese 155, no. 1: 35-64.
Levin, M. E. 2007. Compatibilism and Special Relativity. The Journal of philosophy 104, no. 9: 433-463.
Levin, M. E. nd. The Case for Torture
Levin, M. E. nd. In Defense of Scrooge [1], a libertarian apology in favor of the popular protagonist of Dickens' A Christmas Carol
